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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF STEP-DOWN PROVISIONS IN
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES
Constance A. Anastopoulo ‡ and Thomas P. Gressette Jr. ‡‡
ABSTRACT

A driver who purchases automobile insurance with bodily injury and
property damage liability coverage of $300,000 per occurrence, and
subsequently suffers extensive damages from an automobile accident, does
not expect to face a post-injury lawsuit from her insurer seeking an order
that a “step-down” provision in her policy means the insurer only has to pay
$50,000 per occurrence (the statutory minimum coverage amount
required). However, that is exactly what happened to Sharmin Walls after
she and two friends took a ride in her car together with a third friend who
was driving. Despite the friends’ pleas, the driver refused to stop for a police
blue light, a chase ensued, and ultimately the car crashed, killing one of
Sharmin’s friends and seriously injuring Sharmin and her remaining friend.
When Sharmin and her friends each sought the individual maximum policy
of $100,000 per person, the insurer sued for an order that it was not
required to pay anything more than $25,000 per person up to a total of only
$50,000 for all three claims arising from the accident.
The insurer from whom Sharmin bought $300,000 in coverage asked
the court to enforce what is commonly called a “step-down” provision. Stepdown provisions allow an insurer to reduce (or “step-down”) its total
coverage from what was in the declarations of the policy to a lower number,
usually the minimum insurance the state requires for any driver.
In Sharmin’s case, the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply
the step-down provision. The decision was based upon application of state
insurance laws that require all policies to provide coverage for the named
insureds and permissive users “against liability for damage incurred ‘within
the coverage of the policy.’”
Courts across the country struggle with the enforceability of step-down
provisions. Many courts reject step-down provisions as unfair, against public
policy, or as ambiguous terms that upon examination do not warrant
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enforcement. Other court decisions focus on the freedom to contract, and
many approve the provisions based on specific language of state insurance
statutes.
This Article presents a brief history of these provisions, then surveys
various judicial decisions attempting to put the different rulings in context
with one another. Concluding, the authors suggest decisions like the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Sharmin’s case are correct because
sound public policy and the reasonable expectations of an insured are not
served by allowing the provisions to limit coverage.
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I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Cautionary Tale of Nationwide v. Walls 1

On July 11, 2008, Sharmin Walls allowed Korey Mayfield to drive her
Chevrolet Lumina. 2 Walls, Randi Harper, and Christopher Timms were
passengers in the vehicle. 3 During the ride, a South Carolina Highway Patrol
trooper activated his blue light, signaling for Mayfield to pull over. 4 Instead
of obeying the signal, Mayfield accelerated and then led the trooper on a
high-speed chase with speeds at times exceeding 100 miles per hour. 5 Walls,
Harper, and Timms begged Mayfield to slow down, but he refused. 6
Continuing to drive recklessly, Mayfield ultimately crashed the car, killing
Timms and seriously injuring Walls and Harper. 7 Mayfield, paralyzed from
the single car collision, subsequently entered a plea to charges of reckless
homicide. 8
Walls, Harper, and the Estate of Timms sought coverage from Ms.
Walls’ automobile policy. 9 The claimants soon learned that Sharmin Walls
purchased and maintained liability insurance coverage in excess of the
statutory minimums. 10 Her Nationwide policy included bodily injury and
property damage liability, and uninsured motorist coverage with limits of
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. 11 Presumably, this
1

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 858 S.E.2d 150 (S.C. 2021).

2

Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(A) (2016) (“In the absence of mitigating

3
4

circumstances, it is unlawful for a motor vehicle driver, while driving on a road, street, or
highway of the State, to fail to stop when signaled by a law enforcement vehicle by means of
a siren or flashing light.”).
Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 151.

5
6
7
8
9

10
11

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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policy would allow Walls, Harper, and Timms to each recover up to
$100,000 while still remaining within the $300,000 per accident limit of the
policy.
However, Nationwide did not pay Walls’ claim in accord with these
limits. 12 Instead, the insurer asserted it was required only to pay the statutory
minimum as provided by section 38-77-140 of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina, rather than the liability limits stated in the policy. 13 Nationwide
paid only $50,000 in total to the injured passengers, which is the statutory
minimum provided by section 38-77-140. 14 Nationwide relied on the
policy’s “step-down” provision to pay only the minimum coverage of
$50,000, as opposed to the $300,000 sought by Walls, Harper, and Timms
collectively. 15
A step-down provision is a policy provision that purports to allow an
insurer under certain circumstances to reduce the contracted-for
declarations page coverage amount(s) down to the statutory minimum as
designated by the state in which the policy is sold or is regulated. 16
The step-down policy language in Walls’ Nationwide policy stated:
B. This coverage does not apply, with regard to any amounts
above the minimum limits required by the South Carolina
Financial Responsibility Law as of the date of the loss, to:
...
6. Bodily injury or property damage caused by: a) you; b) a
relative; or c) anyone else while operating your auto; (1) while
committing a felony; or (2) while fleeing a law enforcement
officer. 17
Instead of paying the claims, in Ms. Walls’ instance, “Nationwide
brought this declaratory judgment action requesting the court declare that
the passengers were not entitled to combined coverage of more than
$50,000 for any claims arising from the accident.” 18 Nationwide asserted its
step-down provision (quoted above) permitted Nationwide to reduce
coverage to the statutory minimum. 19
“Walls answered, denying there was any evidence that the flight-from12
13
14

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140(A)(2) (2015) (“An automobile insurance policy

may not be issued or delivered in this State . . . unless it contains a provision insuring [at
least] . . . fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one
accident.”)).
Id. at 151–52.
See Williams v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO) 762 S.E.2d 705, 708 (S.C. 2014).
Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 151–52.
Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
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law enforcement and felony provisions [of her policy] applied [to limit the
coverage].” 20 Nationwide argued that the injuries to Walls, Harper, and
Timms were caused “(1) while committing a felony” and “(2) while fleeing
a law enforcement officer.” 21
Walls argued that it was not she who was committing a felony at the
time of the accident, and therefore her coverage should not be reduced. 22
Further, as the circuit court determined, when Mayfield chose to operate
the vehicle at an excessive rate of speed and then ignored Walls’ pleas to
stop, Mayfield was no longer operating the vehicle within the permission
Walls originally granted. 23 Nonetheless, the insurer attempted to reduce
Walls’ and the other passengers’ coverage to the statutory minimum based
upon the language in the step-down clause. 24
The circuit court ruled against Nationwide. 25 “Nationwide appealed,
and the court of appeals reversed,” concluding the step-down provisions at
issue did not violate South Carolina’s public policy or the state’s statutory
insurance schemes. 26 Walls appealed to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. 27
To answer the question before it, the South Carolina Supreme Court
referred first to its 2014 decision in Williams v. Government Employees
Insurance Co. (GEICO). 28 In Williams, the court ruled that “insurers have
the right to limit their liability and to impose conditions on their obligations
provided they are not in contravention of public policy or some statutory
inhibition.” 29 The court ultimately found, however, that Nationwide’s
attempt to enforce a step-down provision against Walls to “reduce coverage
from the contracted-for policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence to the
statutory minimum of $50,000 per occurrence for damage caused by an
insured while fleeing from law enforcement or engaging in a felony” was
improper. 30
The application of an automobile insurance policy step-down
Id.
Id. See also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 831 S.E.2d 131, 134 (S.C. Ct. App.
2019), rev’d, 858 S.E.2d 150 (S.C. 2021).
Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Walls, 831 S.E.2d at 138).
Id.

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Williams v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO), 762 S.E.2d 705 (S.C. 2014).

29

Id. at 712 (citing B.L.G. Enters., Inc. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 514 S.E.2d 327, 330 (S.C. 1999);

Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 569, 570 (S.C. 1989); Cobb v.
Benjamin, 482 S.E.2d 589, 593 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)).
Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 154 (explicitly relying on Williams and S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77142(C) (“Any endorsement, provision, or rider attached to or included in any policy of
insurance which purports or seeks to limit or reduce the coverage afforded by the provisions
required by this section is void.”)).
30
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provision can have far-reaching and devastating consequences for insureds,
particularly those who are surprised by the step-down policy after
conscientiously insuring themselves and their family members through
excess coverage. 31 When an insured like Sharmin Walls purchases and pays
for automobile insurance coverage in excess of the statutory minimum, she
does so with the expectation that if there are injuries, she and her passengers
will have coverage in excess of the statutory minimum. Further, she foregoes
other insurance coverage or options to prepare for the contingency that she
expects to be covered by her automobile insurance. However, unbeknownst
to her, there is a provision in her policy that allows the insurer to reduce
that coverage to the statutory minimum of the state where the contract was
formed or is enforced. Arguably, this is especially egregious because the
insured learns of the provision when she is attempting to recover under the
policy when she needs it the most. 32 Questions of fairness, freedom to
contract, public policy, and the impact of state insurance laws are just a few
of the influences that guide commentators’ and courts’ analyses of these
provisions. 33 The South Carolina Supreme Court’s assessment of the stepdown provision asserted by Nationwide against Walls highlights the multiple
factors that courts and legislatures around the country are facing as they
attempt to deal with the legality and enforceability of automobile insurance
policy step-down provisions.
In conjunction with proposing the Walls case as an example of the
timeliness of examination of step-down provisions, this Article presents a
brief discussion of the origins and theories of American insurance law and
the development of step-down provisions utilized in automobile insurance
contracts. Part III of this Article highlights how judicial decisions and
legislative actions in some states limit the use of step-down provisions against
insureds. Part IV addresses judicial decisions and legislative actions in states
where step-down provisions have been approved or permitted to operate.
Concluding the Article, Part V suggests that the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decisions are guideposts for proper examination of step-down
provisions in the context of modern insurance law and that the goal of such
analysis should be to prevent the kind of unfair surprise that Sharmin Walls
faced when she needed her insurance the most.
“Excess coverage” is defined by the authors of this Article to be any amount purchased by
the policyholder above the statutory minimum automobile coverage required in each state.
See Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy,
182 S.E.2d 727, 729 (S.C. 1971)) (“[S]tating liability insurance not only affords protection to
insured motorists, it serves the important ‘public purpose of affording protection to innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents.’”) (citation omitted in original) (emphasis added in
original).
See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of Coverage
Exclusion for Injury to or Death of Insured’s Family or Household Members, 52 A.L.R.
Fed. 4th § 18 (1987 & Supp. 2014) (discussing a variety of scenarios in which courts have
examined such provisions, as cited in Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 715).
31

32

33
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II.

THE ORIGINS AND THEORIES OF AMERICAN INSURANCE LAW
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STEP-DOWN PROVISIONS IN
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CONTRACTS

“Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many
persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance touches
the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every
person in the United States.” 34 Because of this importance, there has been
much debate about how insurance should be regulated and whether that
regulation is within federal jurisdiction or the states’ jurisdictions. This
confusion is complicated further by the fact that “the business of insurance”
is difficult to define because it “is conducted by many companies on an
interstate basis, and insureds, particularly drivers, move within and without
state lines.” 35 The question is whether states or the federal government are
in the best position to determine what regulations best serve the public
interest. 36
In 1944, the United States Supreme Court deemed insurance to be
subject to antitrust regulation on the federal level, and in 1958, Congress
acted to permit continued regulation on the state level to deal with other
aspects of insurance governance including taxation. 37 State regulation of
insurance is premised upon the idea that states have a keen interest in having
their citizens adequately protected, and therefore regulate the insurance
industry through state legislatures, regulatory agencies created by statute,
and the judiciary. 38 So, for more than fifty years, states have been addressing
issues such as rate regulation, ensuring solvency of insurance companies,
and protecting the interests of policyholders. 39 That, of course, creates
differences among the states according to each state’s unique priorities.
Some commentators criticize this state-by-state scheme arguing that it
creates a disconnected and unpredictable series of regulations, statutes, and
judicial decisions in an area governing what is arguably one of the most
important aspects of the average American’s life. 40
Uniformity of rules and predictability of standards from state to state
are important because insurance plays a vital role in American culture as it
34

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944), superseded

by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1015 (2006).
LEO P. MARTINEZ & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE
LAW 40 (8th ed. 2017).
Id. at 40–41.
Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 476 (1961).
See generally Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 625 (1999) (advocating for an increase in the regulation of the insurance industry).
Kimball, supra note 37, at 475–78.
See generally Randall, supra note 38 (arguing interests protected by insurance are important
to public welfare and describing criticism of specific state regulatory practices).
35

36
37

38

39
40
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performs important functions in social life. 41 First, it provides a means by
which individuals can manage the risks associated with an uncertain world. 42
As one scholar wrote, it “provides the policyholder with a sense of security,
a feeling of confidence about the future, [and] a freedom from anxiety about
parts of the unknown.” 43 When it comes to insurance regulation, insurance
regulation is dictated by social, political and economic values within and
without the insurance industry. 44 More succinctly, insurance serves an
economic purpose by ensuring that those who suffer loss are compensated
financially for that loss. In this manner, insurance serves to further fairness
(loss shifting), equality (policyholders should be treated without unfair
discrimination), and morality (shifting blame to the responsible party) as a
means to ensure that those who cause harm compensate those who suffer
the harm. 45
In order for these objectives to be met, there is a reciprocal aspect to
an insurance contract that first requires that the insurer’s premiums “should
be reasonable so that insurance buyers pay only what the coverage is
worth.” 46
Second, these social objectives require insurance companies to define
coverages “in a way that is unambiguous and not unreasonably strict.” 47 In
other words, the insurer’s duty is “ensuring that the insured gets what he [or
she] pays for.” 48 Insurance, and consequently the regulation thereof, serves
many purposes and often they are in conflict with one another. However,
since insurance impacts nearly every person and every transaction, the
overarching priority in regulating the industry must be to serve the public
interest.
It is helpful to understand states’ different approaches that result in
different outcomes because insurance is almost exclusively regulated by
states, rather than the federal government, in three main ways: the
promulgation of insurance statutes by state legislatures, the adoption and
enforcement of insurance regulations by state insurance agencies and
commissioners, and the interpretation of both by state and federal courts,
usually applying state law. 49 This is particularly true since regulation of
insurance furthers the general goals of society at large. 50 While the
administration of insurance tends to be similar across states, policies of
41

Kimball, supra note 37, at 478.

42

Id.
Id.

43

MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 35, at 21 (stating “[t]his theme was advanced by”
Kimball, supra note 37, at 471).
Kimball, supra note 37, at 495.
Id. at 491.

44

45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 35, at 21–22, 40.
Randall, supra note 38, at 627.
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insurance must still conform to each state’s particular insurance code and
regulations. 51 This leads to a patchwork of varying contracts that include
certain provisions that are permissible in one state but may be excluded in
the contract or unenforceable in another state.
As state legislatures began to adopt regulatory parameters for auto
insurance sold in their respective state, every state adopted some version of
a motor vehicle financial responsibility law with the intent to protect
individuals by requiring automobile insurance be purchased in at least a
minimum amount designated by statute. 52 This is otherwise known as
compulsory liability insurance or the “statutory minimum” amount of
coverage an automobile owner must have in order to operate a vehicle
within the state. 53 Compulsory automobile liability insurance dates back to
as early as 1925 when Connecticut required any vehicle owner “to establish
financial responsibility.” 54 Massachusetts soon followed and passed a law
requiring owners to obtain compulsory insurance. 55 After which, other states
followed with varying schemes of mandatory liability insurance for owners
of vehicles. 56 The statutory minimum varies from state to state depending
on what amount the state legislature deems is appropriate. 57 Therefore, the
state and corresponding statutory minimum where an insurance policy is
enforced can impact not only if a step-down provision applies, but also the
amount of the coverage that is applicable under the statutory minimum.
Turning attention to step-down provisions generally, it is first helpful
to explain what a “step-down” provision is and how it operates when
applied. A brief discussion of the historical context that gave rise to this twotier system of treating different classes of insureds differently under the same
policy is also warranted.
A step-down provision in an automobile policy limits the coverage
applicable to a particular class of individual not based on what the policy
declarations reflect or the amount purchased by the policyholder; instead,
the coverage is reduced to the minimum limits set by the financial
responsibility statute of the state that governs the policy. 58 In other words,
the provision allows the insurer to lower the coverage amount to a
particularly defined class of insured, under a policy that permits a reduction
51

Id. at 22.

ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 809
(6th ed. 2018).
Id.; MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 35, at 847.
Act of June 23, 1925, ch. 183, 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 3956; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 52, at 808 n.11.
Compulsory Automobile Liability Security Act, ch. 346, 1925 Mass. Acts; JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 52, at 808.
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 52, at 809.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (2007) (statutory minimum of $25,000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21 (statutory minimum of $30,000).
Johnny Parker, The Automobile Liability Coverage Step-Down Clause: The Real Deal or
Merely the Calm Before the Storm?, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 33, 35 (2001).
52

53
54

55

56
57

58
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of coverage below the purchased amount, down to the statutory minimum
of the state.
This is true, regardless of the actual policy limit for which the
policyholder contracted and paid a premium. Clearly, a conflict is created
between the way the step-down defines and treats a “particular class of
individual” and the way state codes define an “insured,” particularly with
regard to permissive users of automobiles.
Step-down provisions in insurance contracts first appeared in response
to state motor vehicle financial responsibility laws and state statutes that
defined who is classified as an insured under the policy. 59 In addition to
setting the statutory minimum amount of insurance required, state
legislatures adopted statutory definitions for who qualified as an insured,
often called “omnibus statutes” or “omnibus clauses.” 60 These statutes
generally require that every motor vehicle liability policy contain an
omnibus clause insuring the named insured “and any other person using or
responsible for the use of the motor vehicle with the expressed or implied
consent of the named insured.” 61 Accordingly, the statutory definition of
who qualified as an insured included permissive users as covered drivers
and provided the benefits of the insurance coverage to those individuals,
even though they were not named in the policy. Once permissive users were
deemed insureds, insurance companies were faced with having to cover
permissive user insureds for whom they knew nothing about. The insurers
had no information about the potential risk(s) associated with these drivers;
therefore, the insurers had not calculated such risk(s) into the premium
charged to the policyholder for the coverage.
Insurers reacted by developing ways to deal with these “users” and
created the concept of a step-down provision to manage this risk. 62 Stepdown provisions allowed insurers to reduce the policy coverage for different
insureds based upon the classification of the driver, especially permissive
users. 63 In other words, insurers initially used step-down provisions to
reduce the policy limits from the contracted amount to the statutory
minimum if the accident involved a permissive user, even if the permissive
user was not at fault. 64 This result followed even though the named insured
purchased liability coverage in excess of the statutorily required amount and
59
60

Id. at 42.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(7) (2021) (“‘Insured’ means the named insured and,

while resident of the same household, the spouse of any named insured and relatives of
either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses with the consent,
expressed or implied, of the named insured the motor vehicle to which the policy applies
and a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy applies or the personal representative of
any of the above.”).
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(D) (2020). See also, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(7).
Parker, supra note 58, at 37.
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id. at 33.
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the statute defines insureds to include permissive users. 65 The creation of
this two-tier system of applying different amounts of coverage within the
policy to different classes of drivers permitted insurers to control the risk
associated with various users, primarily permissive drivers unknown to the
insurer. 66
As one commentator observed, “The vast majority of courts recognize
that two-tier or step-down coverage is not per se illegal.” 67 However, when
considered outside the vacuum of a single policy and through the lens of
general contract principles, a conflict is clear between the freedom to
contract and the public policy goals underlying motor vehicle financial
responsibility acts adopted by state legislatures, which require liability and
other coverages on automobiles. In states where these provisions have been
deemed unenforceable, some courts have held that liability insurance must
serve the public purpose of protecting the innocent victims of motor vehicle
collisions. 68 With that public policy goal in mind, the questions then follow:
Does allowing an insurer to include and apply a step-down provision serve
innocent victims? What about the principle of freedom of contract? Does
the doctrine of reasonable expectations play a role in evaluating these
provisions? What role do the goals and purposes of regulation to protect
the public interest play?

A.

Step-Down Provision Targets: Family, Permissive User, At-Fault,
Felony

As introduced above, initially step-down provisions were designed to
apply to permissive users as a way for insurers to manage the risk associated
with these drivers who were unknown to the insurance company. As stepdown provisions became accepted and permitted by courts as a means to
limit coverage for permissive users, insurance companies began to expand
their use to other classes of drivers. For example, in Williams v. GEICO,
the insurer included a “family step-down” provision in the policy that
applied to family members that reduced the coverage to the statutory
minimum where the injured person is the named insured or any family
member of the named insured. 69 As a rationale for the expansion of stepdown clauses to household or family members, insurers asserted that the
reason behind household exclusions was “to protect insurance companies
from the possibility of family members colluding to obtain greater
compensation for an injured family member than that person rightfully
deserves.” 70
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 37.
Id. at 43.
Id. (citing decisions from jurisdictions across the United States).
See, e.g., Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729 (S.C. 1971).
Williams v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO), 762 S.E.2d 705, 708 (S.C. 2014).
Lewis by Lewis v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Ky. 1996).
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When insurers faced resistance to the general family step-down
provisions, insurers then adopted a nuanced family step-down clause that
applied only when the household member was at fault in the accident. 71 This
was utilized by the insurance company in Lewis by Lewis v. West American
Insurance Co., where the step-down provision reduced the liability coverage
for the named insured and family members of the named insured. 72 Another
variation was used in Aubrey v. Harleysville Insurance Co., where the
insurance company, Harleysville, attempted to apply a step-down provision
to reduce coverage for the customers of a car dealership to the statutory
minimum but maintained the full policy limits for the owner of the
dealership and his employees. 73 Yet another variation created by insurers
was at issue in Nationwide v. Walls, as described previously in this Article,
where the insurer incorporated a “felony step-down” provision into the
policy that applied when the driver was committing a felony while operating
the insured vehicle. 74 When courts dealt with the various types of step-down
provisions introduced by insurers—which allowed insurance companies to
treat different categories of insureds differently, though they were still
recognized as insureds under the policy—it resulted in inequity, which is at
the heart of many of the decisions that find step-down provisions
unenforceable.

B.

Step-Down/Drop-Down Provision versus Exclusion

Under general contract principles, a meeting of the minds is a
necessary step to creating an enforceable contract, including insurance
contracts, that requires an understanding of the terms in the contract by both
parties. 75 This is important because when insurance terms are not clearly
defined within a policy, ambiguities can arise. Therefore, it is important to
understand the distinction between an exclusion and a step-down provision
for several reasons, including the fact that if an ambiguity is created by the
utilization of an improper term, policyholders may not understand the
provisions in their policy and the policy will often be interpreted against the
maker or insurer in such situations. 76 Thus, for both insureds and the
insurance company, an understanding of these terms leads to clarity in the
contract and a better comprehension of the policy for both parties.
Exclusion in the context of an insurance contract is defined as an
71
72

Id. at 832.
Id.

Aubrey v. Harleysville Ins. Cos., 658 A.2d 1246, 1248 (N.J. 1995).
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 858 S.E.2d 150, 151–52 (S.C. 2021).
Samuel C. Damren, A “Meeting of the Minds”: The Greater Illusion, 15 LAW & PHIL.
271, 271 (1996).
MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 35, at 127 (citing J.A. Brundage Plumbing & RotoRooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by
settlement, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)).
73
74
75

76
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insurance policy provision that denies coverage for certain perils, persons,
or locations. 77 Conversely, a step-down provision does not deny the coverage
provided by the policy. Instead, the step-down, sometimes called a dropdown provision, reduces the amount of coverage from the contract value to
the statutory minimum of the state as mandated by financial responsibility
statutes promulgated by the state’s legislative bodies. 78
There are situations where the policy may contain a provision called
an exclusion that functions as a drop-down clause or a step-down provision. 79
In such situations, courts wrestle with both the permissibility and
applicability of the exclusion and the step-down provision together and
separately. The South Carolina Supreme Court commented on the use of
the term “exclusion” instead of “step-down” by the insurer in two separate
cases.
In Williams, where the insurer referred to the provisions in the policy
at issue as “family exclusions,” the court noted that the provisions were more
accurately termed step-down provisions because they did not eliminate the
coverage completely but rather reduced it. 80 Also, in Walls, where the court
explained that while the insurer “characterized the provisions as exclusions,
they are more appropriately denominated as step-downs since, in the event
the provisions are triggered, [the insurer] is obligated to pay the mandatory
minimum limits rather than the liability limit for the parties contracted.” 81
This distinction is important for two reasons: (1) when both the
exclusion and the step-down provision are applied, the consequence can
result in insureds being completely excluded from coverage under one part
of their policy and then having the coverage reduced under another; 82 and
(2) when insurers refer to step-down provisions as exclusions, they often
appear and are mislabeled under the heading of “EXCLUSIONS IN
YOUR POLICY” when in fact, they are not exclusions at all. 83 This can lead
to insureds not knowing or understanding what and where to find these
provisions in their policy. Using the correct terminology is even more
important because generally insurance policies are delivered after the
insured has purchased the coverage, and policyholders would not look for
a provision that reduces coverage in a place where the provision excludes
coverage under the Exclusions heading. Therefore, in order for insureds to
notice the presence and to understand the impact of a step-down provision
in their policy, they must know where to find it.

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 35, at 866 app. B.
See supra Part I.A.
See Krause v. Krause, 589 N.W.2d 721, 722 (Iowa 1999).
Williams v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO), 762 S.E.2d 705, 708 n.2 (S.C. 2014).
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 858 S.E.2d 150, 151 n.1 (S.C. 2021).
See Krause, 589 N.W.2d at 726.
Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 151 n.1.
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STATES WHERE JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND STATUTES REJECT
STEP-DOWN PROVISIONS

The doctrines and factors states use to evaluate step-down
provisions vary depending upon the statutory scheme of the state, the public
policy goals articulated by the legislature in adopting legislation, regulations
and policies enforced by administrative agencies, and protection of social
and ideological values that underpin the role of insurance in society. Of
course, historical judicial determination in the jurisdiction regarding the
interplay of these concepts and factors almost always directs modern results.
Following is a discussion of several examples of various states’
determinations that step-down provisions are impermissible or
unenforceable. This is not an exhaustive survey but is, instead, a highlighting
of select examples of how decisions have been based on the legal doctrines
discussed.

A.

Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and Review of the Policy as a
Whole

In many states, application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations
has invalidated step-down provisions. The doctrine of reasonable
expectations is a principle for interpreting insurance contracts that looks to
the “reasonable expectations of the insured” as the basis for insurance
contract interpretation. 84
In its strongest form, the doctrine of reasonable expectations goes
beyond contra proferentem, a traditional rule of interpretation. Contra
proferentem grants coverage to an insured by construing ambiguous policy
language against the insurance company. In contrast, the doctrine of
reasonable expectations grants coverage when the insured has an objectively
reasonable expectation of coverage even in the absence of ambiguous
insurance policy language. 85
States vary as to their approach on the existence, definition, and
application of the doctrine. The broadest application is defined as “[t]he
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.” 86 The doctrine is an expansion of the contract principle that
David J. Seno, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law: What to
Expect in Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 859, 859 (2002) (quoting Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 970 n.14
84

(1970)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Keeton, supra, note 84, at 967. See also Seno, supra note 84 (“Under the doctrine of
‘reasonable expectations,’ courts often grant coverage to an insured even when the express
language of the policy does not provide coverage.”).
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contract ambiguities are construed and enforced against the maker. 87 It also
recognizes that while insurance carriers have the right to impose reasonable
limitations on their coverage, insureds have the right to reasonable
expectations about what their policy covers or should cover. 88
As applied, the reasonable expectations doctrine grants coverage when
the insured has an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage, even in
the absence of an ambiguity. 89 Also, the concept relies on the premise that
an insurer owes an implied duty to the insured of good faith and fair dealing
arising out of the contract. 90
Courts are divided as to whether there is a “duty to satisfy the
reasonable expectations of the insured” and whether that duty “evolves from
the insurance contract, from the contractual relationship between the
parties, or from some other body of law.” 91 However, the doctrine has been
argued successfully as a basis for finding coverage in policies when the
provisions are confusing, conflicting or even expressly prohibit coverage. 92

1. Colorado
Colorado case law provides an excellent example of the application of
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to invalidate a step-down provision
in an automobile policy. In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mid-Century
Insurance Co., the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of
sufficiency of the notice to the insured by the insurer of the step-down
provision included in an insurance policy. 93 The insured in the case renewed
his policy shortly before the accident involving the covered vehicle driven
by a permissive user occurred. The insurer included a permissive user stepdown provision in the renewal policy that was not present in the original
policy that reduced coverage to the statutory minimum for permissive
users. 94 The declarations page for the renewed policy listed the coverage at
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence, as was the coverage in
the original policy. 95 The court noted that in general when an insurer seeks
to restrict coverage, it must not only use “clear and unequivocal language[,]”
Seno, supra note 84, at 865.
Id. at 867 (arguing that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is adopted by some courts
to avoid an unfair result when insureds believe they have coverage).
87
88

89

Id.

Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Tyger River
Pine Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 170 S.E. 346, 348 (S.C. 1933).
Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, the Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An
90

91

Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts’ Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-ofCovenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV.
325, 335 (1992).
Seno, supra note 84, at 863.
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 246 P.3d 651, 655 (Colo. 2011).
Id. at 656.
92
93
94
95

Id.
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but also “must call such limiting conditions to the attention of the insured.” 96
Further, the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged the “longstanding general principle applicable to insurance policies that an insurance
company is bound by greater coverage in an earlier policy when a renewal
policy is issued but the insured is not notified of the specific reduction in
coverage[,]” especially if the limitation first appears in a renewal policy, as it
did in Shelter. 97 In determining that the insurer failed to give the insured
adequate notice of the step-down provision that reduced his coverage for
permissive users, the court in Shelter found that the insurer failed the notice
requirement in several ways, including: (1) failing to give notice to the
policyholder of the specific pages where the coverage changed, (2) failing to
state the specific amount to which the coverage would be reduced, rather
only stating it would be reduced to the “minimum limits of liability insurance
coverage” as mandated by statute, and (3) that the declarations page
continued to list the same higher levels of coverage, inducing the insured
into believing he was getting the same amount of insurance as his previous
policy had provided. 98 Therefore, the court invalidated the permissive user
step-down provision on the basis that it violated the doctrine of reasonable
expectations of what an insured would expect, particularly when renewing a
policy that previously did not contain the step-down provision. 99
The example in Shelter addresses a renewal situation as the facts
present. Nonetheless, the case provides several instances where the court
determined that the insurer failed to give adequate notice to the insured of
the inclusion of the step-down provision. Recognizing that the insurer owes
a duty to notify the policyholder of the presence and consequences of the
step-down provision, the court determined that the insured would expect to
have the same coverage as he had previously since the insurer failed to give
notice of the change. Accordingly, applying the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, the provision was ruled unenforceable.

2. Kentucky
In another case involving the same insurer from the Colorado case
discussed above, in Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mid-Century Insurance
Co., the Kentucky Supreme Court decided whether the permissive user
step-down provision in an automobile policy was “sufficiently conspicuous,
plain and clear to satisfy the doctrine of reasonable expectations.” 100 In this
case, Danielle Bidwell was seriously injured in a single-vehicle accident

96

Id. at 657.

Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Servs., 893 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Colo. App. 1994)
(quoting Davis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 224, 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
Shelter, 246 P.3d at 656–58.
Id. at 659.
Bidwell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 367 S.W.3d 585, 586 (Ky. 2012).
97

98
99

100
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while riding as a passenger in a car operated by Joshua Tarlton. 101 Tarlton
was a permissive user of the automobile of the owners and named
insureds. 102 Tarlton had no other automobile insurance coverage. 103 The
automobile in the accident was insured for $250,000 per person and
$500,000 per accident. 104 The insurer applied the permissive user step-down
provision in the insured’s policy and reduced the coverage to the statutory
minimum of $25,000. 105
Deciding that the specific language and organization in the policy was
at issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court carefully reviewed both the language
and placement of the step-down clause in the policy and noted that the
manner in which the policy is structured is relevant with respect to whether
an ambiguity exists. 106 Additionally, the court reiterated Kentucky law with
regard to the doctrine of reasonable expectations, explaining that “[t]he gist
of the doctrine is that the insured is entitled to all the coverage he may
reasonably expect to be provided under the policy. Only an unequivocally
conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the company’s intent to
exclude coverage will defeat that expectation.” 107
The court held that the step-down provision violated the doctrine of
reasonable expectations for several reasons including that “the
[d]eclarations page [was] silent with respect to any limitation included later
in the policy, even though the step-down provision radically limits the
amount of coverage that is listed on that page.” 108 Also, the court determined
that the step-down provision was mentioned in limited and confusing
terms. 109 Specifically, the court found the provision particularly confusing
when it reduced the coverage to some indeterminate figure based on an
ambiguous reference to an amount of some financial responsibility law
applicable to the accident. 110 Relying on the coverage as outlined on the
declarations page, the court determined that it created a reasonable
expectation that the amounts listed therein, including $250,000 for bodily
injury, were available to individuals injured in the covered automobile,
regardless of who was driving. 111 However, the court did not hold that the
$25,000 figure in the Kentucky statute setting the statutory minimum for
coverage “must be included in the step-down provision, only that the insurer
must clearly inform the insured how coverage for permissive users is

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. (citing Simon v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Ky. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 590–91.
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limited.” 112
Kentucky’s approach to the doctrine of reasonable expectations to
reject a step-down provision found to be ambiguous is grounded in a reading
of the contract as a whole and the requirements that a contract must
properly inform the insured of coverage. 113 Accordingly, insurance policies
must sufficiently inform the policyholder of the function of the step-down
clause or how the reduction is determined. 114 While Kentucky law
approaches the doctrine through an analysis of whether an ambiguity exists
and therefore a narrow lens, the Kentucky Supreme Court also reviewed
the policy language and placement and considered the importance of the
declarations page as a place where insureds look to confirm the coverage
they purchased and determined that policyholders should be able to
reasonably rely on that language to evaluate their coverage. 115
In both cases involving Shelter Mutual, the Colorado court and the
Kentucky court considered the importance of the declarations page to
insureds in understanding their coverage. 116 Often, the insurance company
asks policyholders to confirm their coverage by reviewing their declarations
page. 117 Therefore, it seems advisable that arguments against the
enforceability of the step-down clause under reasonable expectations
doctrine ought to include reference to what role the declarations page plays
in the placement of the coverage and what notice, if any, is included in the
declarations page of a step-down provision in the policy. 118

B.

Step-Down Provision Complies with Public Policy, Unless
Legislature Determines Otherwise via Statute

1. Illinois
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. presents the
unique situation where the state legislature responded to the inequities
created by step-down provisions after judicial notice (arguably an invitation
to act) regarding the General Assembly’s authority to promulgate statutes
that reflect more equitable outcomes. 119 In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the Illinois Appellate Court found that clauses in an
insurance policy that limit the eligibility limits for permissive drivers only up
to the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law were not contrary to public
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 593.
See id. at 589.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 589–90; Shelter Mut. Ins. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 246 P.3d 651, 659 (Colo. 2011).
Bidwell, 367 S.W.3d at 591.
See id.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d 1096, 1096 (Ill. 2007).
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policy. 120 The court also held that since the responsibility of setting the
liability limits for permissive drivers in insurance contracts is a matter within
the exclusive province of the state legislature, the court could only enforce
the contractual terms of the policy and permit the insurer to apply the stepdown provision for permissive drivers. 121
The result led the Illinois legislature to question whether step-down
provisions or even exclusions of coverage can be applied to permissive
users, including permissive non-household family occupants of covered
vehicles. So, under Illinois law, step-down provisions were initially found to
not offend the public policy of this state. 122 However, after contemplating the
question of equity, the Illinois General Assembly was quick to amend the
statutes and adopted a revised version, which required that all policies for
private passenger automobiles provide “the same limits of bodily injury
liability, property damage liability, uninsured and underinsured motorist
bodily injury, and medical payments coverage to all persons insured under
that policy, whether or not an insured person is a named insured or a
permissive user.” 123
Thereafter, the insurer attempted to exclude coverage for non-family,
non-household passengers under an exclusion. This exclusion was similar
to guest statutes that limited the amount recoverable by passengers in
automobiles in accidents resulting from simple negligence on the part of the
driver. 124 Historically, insurers argued for the adoption of guest statutes for
the same reasons insurance companies currently assert a need for family
step-down provisions: to protect insurance companies from collusive and
fraudulent suits. 125 Guest statutes have been abolished in most states for the
same reasons that perhaps step-down provisions should be. 126
The Illinois Supreme Court contemplated the question that while stepdown provisions with regard to permissive drivers were void, could the
insurer insert a provision that excluded permissive occupants? While not a
step-down provision specifically, the insurer attempted to exclude coverage
for persons who would otherwise be insureds under the policy. Thus, it is
120
121
122

Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1100.

215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/143.13a (2008); Schultz v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 930 N.E.2d 943,
953, n.1 (Ill. 2010).
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 52, at 810.
Lewis by Lewis v. West Am. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829, 831–32 (Ky. 1996) (describing the
history of guest statutes).
See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973) (finding the state guest statute violated
equal protection guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions); Henry v.
Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974) (holding the state guest statute invalid as violation of equal
protection of the laws); McGeehan v. Bunch, 540 P.2d 238 (N.M. 1975) (holding the state
guest statute was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection); Whitworth v. Bynum, 699
S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985) (holding the state guest statute was unconstitutional); Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (holding the state guest statute to be unconstitutional).
123

124
125

126
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instructive to analyze how the court dealt with the distinction between
permissive drivers and permissive occupants as it provides an argument
against the use of step-down provisions.
The court addressed this issue in Schultz v. Illinois Farmers
Insurance, 127 and held insurance companies cannot exclude permissive
passengers from qualifying as insured parties under a primary auto liability
policy's coverage for Underinsured Motorists (“UIM”) because the
exclusionary practice violated section 5/143a–2(4) of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes (“ILCS”). 128 The court considered the issue of whether Illinois law
permitted insurers to issue motor vehicle liability policies in which
occupants of a covered vehicle are afforded uninsured motorist (“UM”)
coverage but excluded from UIM coverage. 129
In Schultz, the case arose from an automobile accident involving a
vehicle driven by Kathleen O’Conner and owned by the Hummelbergs that
was struck by a vehicle driven by Alexandria Fotopoulos. 130 Patricia Smetana
was a passenger in O’Conner's car. 131 Neither she nor O’Conner were
related to the Hummelbergs. 132 Both women were injured, and Smetana
later died from her injuries. 133 Kenneth Schultz was then appointed
Farmers Insurance Company
administrator of Smetana’s estate. 134
(“Farmers”) insured Fotopolou’s vehicle and the laws of Illinois governed. 135
The policy contained liability limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000
per accident. 136 Farmers settled the liability claim with both O’Conner and
Smetana's estate for the policy limits. 137
Farmers also insured the Hummelbergs' vehicle, but it had higher
coverage limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident for
bodily injury, UM coverage, and UIM coverage. 138 O’Conner and Smetana’s
estate each filed claims against Farmers requesting additional compensation
127
128

Schultz, 930 N.E.2d at 943 (Ill. 2010).
See id. at 953; see 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/143a-2(4) (2020) (“For the purpose of this

Code the term ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle whose ownership,
maintenance or use has resulted in in bodily injury or death of the insured, as defined in the
policy, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance
policies . . . required to maintained under Ill. law applicable to the driver or to the person
responsible for such vehicle…and applicable to the vehicle, is less than the limits for
underinsured coverage provided the insured as defined in the policy at the time of the
accident.”)
Schultz, 930 N.E.2d at 945.
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 945–46.
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under the policy’s UIM provisions. 139 Those claims were denied based on
policy language pertaining to UIM coverage. 140
The Schulz court explained:
For purposes of UM coverage, the policy defined an “insured person”
as the person to whom the policy was issued, a family member, or “[a]ny
other person while occupying the car described in the policy.” With respect
to the UIM coverage, however, the definition of “insured person” omitted
occupants of the car. The policy purported to limit UIM coverage to the
person to whom the policy was issued or a family member. Because
O’Conner and Smetana were not among the persons to whom the
Hummelbergs’ policy had been issued and were not members of the family
of any such person, they could not meet the UIM provision’s more
restrictive definition. For this reason, their claims were denied. 141
In considering the case on appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether different classes of individuals, here UM
and UIM claimants, could be treated differently. The court addressed both
Schultz and Weglarz. 142 Simultaneously, both contemplated permissive user
occupants: non-family in Shultz and non-resident family occupants of a
covered automobile and the denial of UIM coverage in Weglarz. In
Weglarz, a non-household family member occupant (non-resident mother
of insured) of a covered automobile was injured in an accident where the
vehicle was driven by the named insured. 143 After receiving the liability
coverage from the tortfeasor, Weglarz sought coverage under the UIM
coverage on the car she occupied. 144 The coverage on the car for UIM was
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. 145 Since “occupants” was
omitted in the definition of “insured” under both the Schultz Farmers policy
and the Weglarz Farmers policy, the insurer denied the UIM claims in both
cases. 146
The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed two issues regarding
permissive occupants: (1) whether permissive occupants are contemplated
within the definition of permissive users; and (2) whether insurers can treat
UM insureds differently from UIM insureds. 147 In addressing the first issue,
the court first stated that if insurance terms are clear and unambiguous, they
must be enforced unless they violate public policy. 148 Reiterating that public
policy is determined by the constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, and
139
140
141

Id.
Id.
Id.

Schultz v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co, 901 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) [hereinafter Weglarz].
Schultz, 930 N.E.2d at 946; Weglarz, 901 N.E.2d at 959. Weglarz was the mother of the
insured but did not reside in the same household. Id. at 960.
Schultz, 930 N.E.2d at 946–47.
Id. at 947.
142
143

144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 949.
Id.
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that terms of an insurance policy that conflict with statutes are void and
unenforceable, the court addressed whether “users” included
“occupants.” 149 Under Illinois law, insurance policies are required to provide
certain liability minimum amounts and must “insure not only the persons
named in the policy but also ‘any other person using or responsible for the
use’ of the subject vehicle with the express or implied permission of the
insured.” 150 Since the language of the statute did not refer to “permissive
drivers” but rather “permissive users,” and giving the language its plain and
ordinary meaning, the court determined that “permissive occupants” fell
within the definition of “permissive users” because the occupants are also
“using” the covered vehicle at the time of the accident. 151 Therefore, insurers
could not exclude non-resident family or non-family member occupants
from coverage pursuant to the statutory language. 152
As to the second issue of whether insurers can treat UM coverage
differently from UIM coverage, the court noted that the ILCS required that
if the liability coverage exceeded the statutory minimum, the UM provisions
must provide the same higher coverage amounts and must extend to all who
are insured under the policy’s liability provisions unless the insured makes
a written election for less. 153 In addition to providing UM coverage, motor
vehicle liability policies in Illinois are also required to provide UIM
coverage where the UM coverage exceeds the statutory minimums required
for liability bodily injury and must extend coverage outlined by the policy. 154
Finding that UM and UIM are “inextricably linked,” the court held that
insurers must treat an insured the same under UM and UIM coverage. 155
Further, the court concluded that public policy considerations warrant
treating UM and UIM coverage the same. 156
Opposing this result, Farmers argued that because the coverage listed
on the declarations page was the same for liability, UM, and UIM, it met
the statutory requirement on its face. They further argued the insurer could
then reduce the coverage pursuant to a provision in the policy and therefore
not violate the statutory language. 157 However, the court rejected Farmers’
argument because it would render the statute meaningless and ignore the
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id. (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7–203, 7–317(b)(3) (2004)).
Id. at 949–50.
Id. at 950.
Id.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. (explaining that because uninsured and underinsured motorist policies provide virtually

the same coverage to the insured, it would be anomalous to declare insureds ineligible for
any UIM benefits under circumstances where they would be entitled to full UM benefits but
for the fact that the tortfeasor had minimal insurance rather than none at all. This result
would be directly contrary to the legislature's intent when it enacted section 143a–2 of the
Illinois Insurance Code.)
Id. at 951.
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legislative intent to cover permissive users, including permissive occupants,
when they are injured while occupying a covered vehicle. 158 Therefore, the
court found the provisions of the policy that attempted to exclude
permissive occupants as insureds or exclude UIM coverage while providing
UM coverage, void and unenforceable under Illinois law. 159
Shultz, Weglarz, and the history of this issue in Illinois illustrate how
important statutory language can be in addition to acting as a prerequisite
for a court’s willingness to reject enforcement of step-down provisions.
Interestingly, the insurer in both Illinois cases argued that because the
declarations page provided by the insurer listed equal coverage for UM and
UIM claimants, it satisfied the statutory requirements on its face, and
therefore it could reduce or exclude the coverage for UIM claimants later
in the policy and still remain in compliance with the statutory scheme. The
Illinois Supreme Court recognized that if it were to accept the insurer’s
argument that the declarations page met the language of the statute, while
the function of the policy was to violate it, the practice would undercut the
purpose and legislative intent in adopting the statute to protect insureds and
innocent parties by allowing the insurer to meet the requirement in one
place, only to violate the statute in another with a provision that treated
claimants differently.

2. South Carolina
Two South Carolina cases, including the Walls decision highlighted in
the Introduction to this Article, look at statutory language and step-downs
as framed by the actions or inactions of the state legislature to evaluate when
a step-down provision may be enforced. 160 The Illinois legislature reacted to
the judicial decision regarding step-down provisions by quickly adopting
new statutory language that required the same limits of liability, uninsured,
and underinsured motorist bodily injury to all persons insured whether or
not an insured person is a named insured or a permissive user. 161 In contrast,
when faced with an opportunity to react to or clarify the holding in Williams
with a statutory change, the South Carolina legislature took no action. This
inaction was interpreted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina as the
legislature’s condonation of the holding in Williams. In other words, the
court determined that the failure of the South Carolina legislature to act in
response to its decision in Williams v. GEICO 162 indicated the General
Assembly’s assent to its analysis of the statute, which precluded step-down
158
159

Id.
Id.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Walls, 858 S.E.2d 150, 153 n.3 (S.C. 2021) (stating that
petitioners abandoned the public policy argument and therefore did not explicitly decide the
case on the basis of a violation of public policy); Williams v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. (GEICO),
762 S.E.2d 705, 705 (S.C. 2014).
15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/143.13a (2008); Schultz, 930 N.E.2d at 953 n.1.
Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 705.
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provisions under South Carolina law. 163
In Williams, the personal representatives for the estates of Edward and
Annie Mae Murry brought actions to obtain the full coverage of a policy
owned by the Murrys in the amount of $100,000 in liability proceeds for
bodily injury instead of the statutory minimum when the insurer applied a
family step-down provision. 164 The Murrys, who were husband and wife,
were the only named insureds on the policy when their insured motor
vehicle was struck by a train, killing both. 165 It was unknown who was driving
the vehicle at the time of the accident. 166 The insurer took the position that
since the actual driver could not be determined, both the husband and the
wife were subject to the family step-down provision included in the
exclusions portion of the policy and attempted to pay the estates $15,000
each, which was the statutory minimum at the time. 167
The Supreme Court of South Carolina first addressed the issue of
ambiguity, and while finding the language of the policy and placement of the
step-down provision “not artfully worded,” it did not find the policy to be
ambiguous. 168 The court then addressed the public policy argument. The
court noted that “[w]hile parties are generally permitted to contract as they
see fit, freedom of contract is not absolute and coverage that is required by
law may not be omitted.” The court held that the family step-down provision
that reduced the coverage from the stated policy amount to the statutory
minimum violated public policy and was therefore void. 169 The court further
stated that the provision not only conflicted with the mandates set forth in
the statutory construction requiring certain provisions in insurance policies,
but also its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare. 170
After Williams, insurers in South Carolina attempted to enforce other
kinds of step-down provisions different from the family step-down clause
contemplated in that case. Then, in 2021, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina decided Walls, wherein the court addressed the viability of a felony
step-down provision under South Carolina law. 171 The analysis begins with
the court noting the distinction between the family step-down provision
contemplated in Williams and the felony step-down provision at issue in
Walls but applying a similar understanding of South Carolina insurance law
in reaching its decisions. 172 In reviewing the same statutory provisions, the
court held that it made no distinction between mandatory minimum
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Walls, 858 S.E.2d at 154–55.
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coverage and excess coverage with regard to mandatory provisions required
in a policy, including a prohibition on provisions that reduce coverage from
the face amount. 173
In applying the same logic and reasoning in determining Williams, the
court held the felony step-down provision at issue in Walls violated statutory
language and the legislative intent to frame public policy on this issue. 174
Specifically, the court applied the same interpretation of the statutory
language in Williams to determine that South Carolina Code of Laws
(“South Carolina Code”) section 38-77-142(C) prohibits any step-down
provision in a liability policy’s coverage. 175 Nationwide presented an
argument similar to that of the insurer in Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v.
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 176 and it argued that the
statute operated as a mere omnibus provision defining who must be covered
in a liability policy. 177 Nationwide also argued that other provisions of the
South Carolina Code permitted limitations on excess coverage so as to
render section 38-77-142(C) inapplicable. 178
The Walls court determined that to give credence to Nationwide’s
argument would invalidate section 38-77-142(C) completely. 179 The
legislature had not altered or amended the statue in response to the
Williams decision, so the court interpreted the inaction as the legislature’s
intent to recognize the validity and purpose of section 37-77-142(C). 180
Additionally, the majority took note that in reaching its decision in Walls, it
was merely remaining faithful to the language of the statute as interpreted in
Williams, “which the General Assembly has seen fit not to alter . . . .” 181
In deciding Walls, the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined
that interpretation of the legislative intent regarding the impropriety of stepdown provisions was set forth in Williams and remained unchanged
regardless of the attempt by the insurer to insert the narrower felony stepdown clause. In an unequivocal indication of its rejection of step-down
provisions, the court reviewed the legislative intent underlying the statutory
scheme, and “the legislature’s recognition of the role [that] notice provisions
play in insurance contracts.” 182 The court further stated that the specific
language of the statute adopted by the legislature to protect the public
recognized that once an insurer placed required provisions in the policy with
agreed-upon limits of coverage, any attempt by the insurer to reduce the
173
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coverage would be void. 183 These South Carolina cases provide good
examples of how the judiciary identifies public policy by reviewing the
legislative intent in passing legislation, as well as reviewing the specific
language in the statute to determine the role policy plays in framing the
purpose and intent behind the legislation.

3. Utah
Utah is another state where step-down provisions have been found to
violate statutory provisions. In Shores v. Liberty Mutual, 184 the Utah Court
of Appeals held that a family step-down provision in the policy, called a
“household exclusion,” violated the statutory definition of an insured and
disallowed different treatment between insureds. 185 Additionally, the court
noted that a step-down provision is one in which “the coverage ‘steps down’
from the actual policy limits to the minimum required by the statute[,]” and
while labeled an exclusion, it reduced the coverage and functioned as a stepdown provision. 186 Under the Utah Code, the court found the step-down
provision was expressly prohibited by the statutory language. 187 Specifically,
the court noted that the statute states that:
[W]here a claim is brought by the named insured or a person
described in [s]ubsection (1)(a)(iii), the available coverage of the
policy may not be reduced or stepped down because . . . the
named insured or any of the persons described in this
[s]ubsection (a)(1)(iii) driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault
in the accident. 188
The court further observed that pursuant to the statute, those persons
described in subsection (a)(1)(iii) are “persons related to the named insured
. . . .” 189 Specifically, the policy stated:
[Liberty Mutual] will pay for ‘bodily injury’ . . . for which any
‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of an auto
accident, . . . .
[t]he following exclusion is added:

183

Id.
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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 147 P.3d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
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Id. at 458 n.4 (quoting 1 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §
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Id. at 459.

187
188
189

Id.
Id. at 459–60.

564

2022] THE ENFORCEABILITY OF STEP-DOWN PROVISIONS 565

[Liberty Mutual] do[es] not provide Liability Coverage for any
‘insured’ for ‘bodily injury’ to you to the extent that the limits of
liability for this coverage exceed the applicable minimum limits
for liability specified by UTAH CODE ANN. Section 31A-22304. 190
The Shores were an elderly couple who were involved in an auto
accident while Mr. Shores was driving, and he was primarily at fault. 191 Mrs.
Shores was severely injured and permanently disabled as a result of the
accident and sought to recover $100,000 under the liability coverage of their
policy. 192 Liberty Mutual applied the household exclusion and reduced the
coverage to the statutory minimum of $25,000. 193 The court determined that
the Utah Code prohibited the application of the family step-down provision
“where a claim is brought by the named insured or a [household family
member] . . . the available coverage of the policy may not be reduced or
stepped-down because . . . the named insured or any [household family
member] . . . driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in causing an
accident.” 194
In reviewing the legislation, the court emphasized the legislature’s
concern that insurance companies were providing minimum liability
insurance to family members even though the premiums were paid for a
much higher level of coverage, and to address this, the Utah legislature
specifically included the words “stepping down” to ensure household stepdown provision violated the statute. 195 Oddly, Utah seems to be one of the
few states that expressly prohibit family step-down provisions by statute.
There are, however, other states that interpret statutory language to exclude
step-down provisions from being applied, such as Wisconsin. 196 However,
as the Shores court stated, the Utah legislature, using specific language,
intentionally addressed that step-down clauses violated Utah law in adopting
legislation to prohibit their use. 197

4. Wisconsin
Similar to the issues raised in Schultz and Weglarz under the Illinois
statutes, the Wisconsin Supreme Court contemplated whether an
automobile policy could treat insureds with different amounts of coverage
based upon the insured’s classification, which in function amounted to a
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step-down clause. In Smith v. National Indemnity Co., 198 the insured’s policy
provided limits of $10,000 per person, $20,000 for individuals who rented
a car but provided $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence for the
named insured. 199 The issues before the court were whether the omnibus
coverage statute applied and whether the coverage for the named insured
extended to the renters of the cars. 200 The Wisconsin omnibus statute
provided that “no policy of insurance shall be issued or delivered . . . unless
it contains a provision reading substantially” that policies must treat and
apply “in the same manner and under the same provisions” to the named
insured, and to “any person or persons while riding in or operating any
automobile described in this policy . . . .” 201
The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted this statutory language to
preclude insurers from issuing a policy that granted higher dollar limits of
protection to the named insured than to car renters. 202 Specifically, the court
held that when the “omnibus statute speaks of the indemnity which must be
extended, it is speaking of both coverage in a limited sense and limits of
liability . . . .” 203 Therefore, the court found that the insurer could not issue
a policy granting higher dollar limits of protection to the named insured than
it did to car renters. 204 In other words, the provision in the policy acted as a
step-down clause that reduced coverage for automobile renters below those
applicable to named insureds and therefore violated the statutory language
and thus was impermissible under Wisconsin law. This again is an example
where a state court determined that provisions that act like step-down
clauses to reduce coverage that apply to different classes of insureds within
a policy are impermissible and violate statutory requirements defining who
an insured is.

5. Virginia
In Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corp., 205 the Virginia Supreme Court held that step-down
provisions violate applicable provisions of the Virginia Code. 206 In Hardware
Mutual, the issue before the court was whether the “special provisions
limiting the amount of coverage on certain insureds were in conflict with
the” state omnibus statute. 207 Ultimately, the court ruled broadly that each
198
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policy of automobile liability insurance in the state of Virginia must furnish
a permissive user the same coverage as is afforded the named insured. 208
James Brown purchased an automobile, and after the dealer delivered
it, he permitted his brother, Persell Brown to operate it. 209 Persell Brown
was then involved in an accident, injuring another driver. 210 The trial court
determined that Persell was a permissive user of the automobile. 211 The
insurer argued that if Persell was a permissive user, thus an insured within
the terms of its policy, the limit of the liability was $15,000 (the statutory
minimum at the time) and not the $300,000 provided to the named insured
under the policy. 212
The insurer asserted that the step-down provision did not violate the
Virginia omnibus statute because the clause provided the “permissive user
the same quality of coverage but not necessarily the same quantity of
coverage extended [to] the named insured.” 213 The insurer also argued that
since it recognized the permissive user as an insured under the policy and
provided some coverage to these individuals, it satisfied the omnibus statute
that required insurers to include permissive users as insureds, thereby
providing the “quality” of coverage to the permissive user as an insured. 214
Finally, the insurer claimed it was entitled to provide a different quantity of
coverage to these claimants and thus treat insureds, named insureds and
permissive users, differently by applying different limits of coverage to each
based upon the classification. 215
Upon review of the omnibus statute, the court found that the statute
requires each policy of automobile liability insurance to furnish a permissive
user the same coverage as is afforded the named insured. 216 Further, the
court held that the coverage at issue applied to the quantity of coverage as
well as the quality of coverage, and, therefore, “[t]he permissive user is
entitled to the identical protection in every respect to which the named
insured is entitled.” 217
In reaching its decision, the Virginia Supreme Court responded to the
insurance company’s argument that ruling for the insured would undermine
the intent and purpose of the statutes to provide equal coverage to those
identified as insureds. 218 Rather than ascertain the intent of the legislature,
the court focused on the language of section 38.1-381(a), specifically the
208
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words “same coverage.” 219 The court stated that “[w]ithout question, the
words Same coverage as used above apply to the quantity of coverage as well
as the quality of coverage.” 220 Accordingly, the court emphasized, “[t]he
permissive user is entitled to the identical protection in every respect to
which the named insured is entitled.” 221 Thus so holding, the Virginia
Supreme Court endorsed the public policy goal of equity in insurance which
starts with the premise that policyholders should be treated without unfair
discrimination. 222

C.

Step-Down Provision Violates Public Policy

Public policy analysis is a cornerstone of many judicial decisions
regarding the applicability of and enforceability of insurance policies. 223
Specifically, courts have held that public policy dictates that “every insured,
as defined in the policy, is entitled to recover under the policy for damages
he would have been able to recover against the negligent motorist if that
motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance.” 224 As the cases
indicate, courts conclude that step-down provisions public policy when the
clause offends the legislative intent in adopting mandatory financial
responsibility coverage statutes and omnibus clause provisions that define
who is an insured, when the provision transgresses regulatory goals of
protecting insureds, or when those policies provide less uninsured motorist
coverage than required by statute.

1. Washington
In an early case addressing a family or household exclusion that laid
the groundwork for many judicial decisions that ruled that family step-down
provisions violated public policy, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals’ decision that a family exclusion provision was void as
against public policy. 225 The case involved a wife, who was injured while
riding with her husband on an insured motorcycle. 226 The husband was
negligent in the accident that resulted in serious injuries to the wife, who
filed a claim for both liability and underinsured motorist coverage from the
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Kimball, supra note 37, at 495.
See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Garcia, No. 20-14387, 2021 WL 2935425, at *3 (11th
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insurer that provided coverage on the motorcycle. 227 The insurer declined
both claims and asserted that it owed no coverage under the family exclusion
which denied coverage for family members of the named insured. 228 While
not a step-down case, the Washington Supreme Court engaged in an
instructive and thorough analysis of what and how public policy is
determined, which provided later courts with a blueprint to analyze stepdown provisions within the context of public policy. Additionally, the court
took the opportunity to address issues raised in an amicus curiae brief
offered on behalf of the insurer that addressed the insurance company’s
freedom of contract argument. 229
First, the court analyzed public policy by reviewing the state’s financial
responsibility statute, finding that “the statute creates a strong public policy
in favor of assuring monetary protection and compensation to those persons
who suffer injuries through the negligent use of public highways by others.” 230
In order to achieve this goal, the court determined that while the statute did
not require mandatory insurance coverage, the legislature demonstrated its
intended policy of providing adequate compensation to those injured
through the negligent use of the state's highways. 231 The court recognized that
the intended purpose of the state’s Financial Responsibility Act was for:
[T]he benefit of owners and drivers of motor vehicles . . . and,
more fundamentally, [it is] designed to give monetary protection
to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons who,
while lawfully using the highways themselves, suffer serious injury
through the negligent use of those highways by others.” 232
Additionally, the court addressed the public policy goals underlying
the adoption of uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured motorist
coverage statutes in Washington, determining that the statutes served both
a public safety and a financial security measure by protecting innocent
victims and the public treasury because of accidents caused by insolvent
drivers who lacked the resources to compensate those they negligently
injured. 233 Specifically, the court held that:
The family or household exclusion clause strikes at the heart of
this public policy. This clause prevents a specific class of innocent
victims, those persons related to and living with the negligent
driver, from receiving financial protection under an insurance
227
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229
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policy containing such a clause. In essence, this clause excludes
from protection an entire class of innocent victims for no good
reason.
This exclusion becomes particularly disturbing when viewed in
light of the fact that this class of victims is the one most frequently
exposed to the potential negligence of the named insured. 234
The court distinguished the family exclusion from other exclusions
permitted under Washington insurance law that were based upon the risk
associated with the operator of the insured vehicle. 235 For example, the court
noted differences between this exclusion and provisions that excluded
drivers under the age of twenty-five or when the vehicle was driven by a
permissive user who was not a resident family member of the named
insured. 236 The court found that the family or household exclusion, by
contrast, was directed at a class of innocent victims who have no control over
the vehicle's operation and who cannot be said to increase the nature of the
insurer’s risk. 237 Ultimately, the court rejected the rationale offered by
insurance companies as a basis for inclusion of the family exclusion that it
protected insurers against collusion and fraud by family members and
determined that an exclusion that denies coverage when certain victims are
injured was violative of public policy. 238
The court then took the additional step of addressing the argument
raised in the amicus curiae brief that asserted by including a family exclusion
provision, the parties were merely exercising their rights under freedom of
contract principles and that the family or household exclusion merely
reflected a choice by the insurer not to accept additional risks which would
increase insurance premiums. 239 Insurance companies further argued that if
the insured wished to add that additional coverage, she was free to bargain
with another insurer who offered such coverage. 240 The court took issue with
this argument, finding that (1) there was no guarantee that other “such
coverage” was even available in the state, (2) that if the court permitted one
insurer to include a family exclusion, then all insurers would include such
an exclusion, and (3) that the exclusion affected persons who were in no
position to bargain or contract with the insurer; therefore, the freedom of
contract argument was unrealistic under the circumstances and without
merit. 241 In conclusion, the court determined that the public policy objective
234
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was to assure compensation to the victims of negligent and careless drivers
and that the strength of this public policy would override any freedom of
contract analysis. 242
This case clearly demonstrates a framework for other courts to analyze
and assess the conflict a step-down provision creates with the public policy
goals of protecting insureds and innocent victims of accidents, as well as
addressing the freedom of contract argument offered by insurers as a basis
to include these provisions.

2. Kentucky
Perhaps one of the most direct condemnations of step-down
provisions appears in Lewis by Lewis v. West American Insurance Co.,
where the Kentucky Supreme Court determined the invalidity of family or
household exclusion clauses contained in an automobile liability policy. 243
The case involved a minor, Angel Lewis, who was a passenger in an
automobile owned and operated by her mother, Loretta Lewis. 244 The
vehicle collided with an eighteen-wheeler that resulted in the death of
Loretta and serious injuries including brain damage to Angel. 245 West
American insured the Lewis automobile for liability coverage in the amount
of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. 246 However, the
policy contained an endorsement entitled “Amendment of Policy
Provisions⸺Kentucky” that included a “family exclusion” specifically
limited liability coverage for “bodily injury” to the named insured or any
family member of the named insured. 247 While the policy and therefore the
court referred to the clause as an “exclusion,” the provision operated as a
family step-down provision that reduced the coverage to the minimum
liability coverage statutorily required by the Kentucky Motor Vehicle
Reparations Act. 248 Thus, the insurance policy reduced the policy liability
coverage to the $25,000 statutory minimum where the injured person is the
named insured or a member of a named insured’s family regardless of who
is driving the automobile. 249
In reaching its decision, the court first addressed the rationale offered
by insurers that family step-down provisions are necessary to combat
collusion between family members to obtain greater compensation than the
injured family member rightfully deserves. 250 The court held that family
exclusion provisions were invalid based upon public policy arguments, and
242
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the actual rate of incidences of collusion among family members compared
to the possibility of collusion by a few did not justify the denial of benefits
to an entire innocent class. 251
The court then reviewed guest statutes, interspousal immunity, and
parental immunity, finding that each was premised on the belief that they
were also necessary to prevent fraud and collusion. 252 Ultimately, the court
concluded that it was against public policy to allow insurers to treat different
classes of passengers differently based on classification or antiquated bases
for immunity such as guest statutes and outdated interspousal immunity and
parental immunity. 253 Importantly, with regard to family exclusions, the court
noted that family exclusions are “particularly disturbing when viewed in light
of the fact that this class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to the
potential negligence of the named insured.” 254
The court observed that typical family relations require family
members to ride together and permitting such an exclusion would promote
socially destructive inequities. 255 Also, the court stated that motor vehicle
policies are largely contracts of adhesion given that the insured does not
have an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract and are offered
on a “‘take it or leave it’ basis.” 256 The court noted that consumers, therefore,
have no warning of any reduction clauses, including step-down provisions
inserted in their policy. 257 In a strongly worded rebuke, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the “over-inclusiveness of the family exclusion
clause is socially destructive and corrosive to our citizenry’s confidence in
our system of justice.” 258 In finding these provisions impermissible and
invalid under Kentucky law, the court stated that “fear of collusion is
inadequate justification for the existence of the family exclusion.” 259
The court also addressed the public policy argument, noting that
public policy is determined by the Constitution, by statutes, and by the
highest courts to evaluate whether a contract or agreement “has a tendency
to injure the public or is against the public good, or is contrary to sound
policy.” 260 Observing that “fair compensation for injuries received by
innocent victims of another’s negligence is the controlling policy
consideration,” the court held that family exclusions injure citizens because
251
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they deny injured persons the ability to rely on policy declarations
purchased by the policyholder. 261 In a rebuke of household step-down
provisions, the court held that to uphold the family exclusion would result
in perpetuating socially destructive inequities and that “family exclusion
provisions in liability insurance contracts violate the public policy of the
Commonwealth and are unenforceable.” 262
As one court stated, enforcing step-down provisions in insurance
contracts can have devastating consequences for insureds. 263 Consumers
purchase automobile insurance coverage out of a sense of personal, legal,
financial and social responsibility, and oftentimes they purchase an amount
in excess of the mandatory amounts. 264 By purchasing higher insurance
limits, the insured provides a method to compensate those injured as a
result of the insured’s negligence. 265 In addition to liability coverage,
policyholders also purchase uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured
motorist coverage in excess of the statutory minimum to protect themselves,
their family members, their permissive users, and their guests when injured
by another driver who may be uninsured or underinsured. 266 Step-down
provisions ignore these rationales and goals of insureds, and despite the fact
that insureds have purchased excess coverage, these clauses reduce the
amount of coverage to the statutory minimum. Therefore, it is important to
understand why certain state courts have enforced and applied step-down
provisions. The following are general bases by which courts have deemed
these provisions permissible. While not an exhaustive list, these bases
represent some of the most frequent rationales utilized by state courts in
enforcing step-down provisions and where they have been used.
IV.

A.

STATES WHERE STEP-DOWN PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN
APPROVED OR ENFORCED

Rules of Contract Interpretation—Contractual Ambiguity

1. Iowa
A 1999 decision of the Iowa Supreme Court involved a policy with
both an exclusion and a step-down provision present in the insurance
contract. 267 Ultimately relying upon Iowa’s traditional rules of contract
interpretation, as previously applied to insurance policies, the Supreme
Court of Iowa found a family member exclusion enforceable and a stepdown provision applicable to exclude the claim of an injured passenger (the
261
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driver’s wife). 268 The court held that the policy endorsement’s step-down
provision was “unambiguous” and “enforceable,” and that “as a matter of
law [the insured] has failed to show that the reasonable expectations
doctrine [wa]s applicable.” 269
The case involved a one-car accident where the husband was driving a
truck and lost control of the vehicle, injuring his wife who was a passenger
in the truck. 270 The husband was at fault in the accident. 271 The application
of the exclusion in the policy denied liability coverage for family members
resulting in the husband/tortfeasor being deemed an uninsured driver. 272
More specifically, the insurance policy contained an exclusion provision that
stated that there was “no liability coverage for any insured for bodily injury
sustained by another insured or family member.” 273 In other words, the
policy contained a family exclusion that denied any coverage to any insured
or family members when the at-fault party was a family member. It also
contained an endorsement in the policy with a “step-down provision” that
reduced the policy coverage from the contracted-for amounts to the
statutory minimum in the event there was no liability coverage under the
policy for injury to a family member or named insured due to the family
member exclusion. 274 This allowed the insurer to deem any insured or family
member uninsured, and then apply a step-down provision to reduce
coverage for family members injured in the accident other than the
tortfeasor.
The wife/passenger then looked to her uninsured motorist (“UM”)
coverage for recovery. The declarations page of the policy listed the
uninsured motorist coverage as $100,000 for each person and $300,000 per
occurrence. 275 However, the insurer applied the step-down provision. The
result allowed the insurer to apply both the exclusion denying family
member liability coverage, meaning the family member/tortfeasor became
an uninsured driver, and then to apply the step-down provision to reduce
the uninsured motorist coverage to the statutory minimum. When the
insurer enforced both the exclusion and the step-down provision, the court
held that the exclusion and provision were not ambiguous even if the parties
could not agree on the amount of coverage designated by the Iowa statute
regarding mandatory minimum coverage. 276
The court began its analysis by stating:
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“Because insurance policies are in the nature of adhesive
contracts, we construe their provisions in a light most favorable to
the insured.” A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
475 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Iowa 1991). “In the construction of
insurance policies, the cardinal principle is that the intent of the
parties must control; and except in cases of ambiguity this is
determined by what the policy itself says.” Id. at 618. 277
The court went on to explain:
In deciding whether the endorsement language reducing the
uninsured motorist coverage was enforceable, the district court
considered whether the language was ambiguous. The court
noted the rule that “[p]olicy ambiguity exists when, after
application of principles of contract interpretation, a genuine
uncertainty remains as to which one of two or more meanings is
the proper one.” See Kibbee v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 525
N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1994). 278
Following this analysis, the district court concluded that the UM
endorsement language was ambiguous, not because it believed there were
multiple possible interpretations of the policy language, but because it
believed a layperson would not understand that the phrase “financial
responsibility law of Iowa” used in the UM endorsement refers to Iowa
Code chapter 321A. 279 The court also believed a layperson would not
understand that the liability limits specified in chapter 321A.1(10) would be
the applicable limits of UM coverage in the event that there was no liability
coverage due to the family member exclusion. 280
The court stated:
Upon our consideration of the language of the policy as a whole,
including the declarations page and attached endorsements, see
Ferguson v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 512 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa
1994) (in construing insurance policies, court considers effect of
policy as a whole, in light of all declarations, riders, or
endorsements), we conclude that the district court incorrectly
determined that the language of the UM coverage endorsement
is ambiguous. 281
Having concluded the policy (even as a contract of adhesion) was not
ambiguous, the court then examined whether Mrs. Krause’s claim that “the
277
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doctrine of reasonable expectations applied to prevent the uninsured
motorist coverage endorsement language from being enforced.” 282
Ultimately, the court concluded that while a layperson may have some
difficulty matching phrases used in the policy, those issues do not justify
application of Iowa’s “carefully circumscribed” doctrine of reasonable
expectations. 283

2. Kansas
In Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Hill, the Court of Appeals
of Kansas held that a step-down provision and language addendum limiting
liability to “limits required by Kansas law” might be “stylistically inelegant”
but it is not ambiguous such that a reasonable person would not be misled
as to the policy limits. 284 In Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., the
Kansas court upheld a policy’s permissive user step-down provision that
reduced the coverage from the declarations page amount of $300,000 per
occurrence to the statutory minimum of the state where the accident
occurred when the automobile was operated by a permissive user. 285 Since
the automobile covered under the policy was a loaner from a car dealership,
the operator was deemed a permissive user, and therefore the step-down
provision applied to reduce the coverage. 286 Interestingly, since the policy
was governed by the law of the state where the accident occurred, it could
result in a reduction to an amount less than the statutory minimum required
by Kansas law.
The court relied on prior case law that held that if the provision
violated the statutory minimum coverage at an amount less than the
statutory minimum, the provision was still not void. 287 Rather, the amount
was adjusted to the statutory minimum so as to be in compliance with the
Kansas motor vehicle liability insurance requirements under the statute and
the resulting adjustment would bring the coverage within the statutory
requirement. 288 Interestingly, it seems in enforcing the step-down provision,
the Kansas court, while recognizing the ambiguous nature of the step-down
provision by calling the language “inelegant,” 289 engaged in legal gymnastics
and procedural maneuvering to contort the step-down provision language
to fit within the Kansas mandatory minimum of coverage by adjusting the
actual reduction to an amount that satisfied the statutory requirement. In so
doing, the outcome in Universal Underwriters conflicts with the policy goals
282
283
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of fair and equitable treatment of insureds and the contract principles of
unambiguous terms and the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in
every contract.

B.

Freedom to Contract

1. South Carolina
While South Carolina has recently determined that step-down
provisions violate statutory language and legislative intent and are
unenforceable under South Carolina law, the supreme court majority and
dissenting opinions addressed the freedom of contract. 290 Therefore,
returning to the previous discussion on Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. v. Walls, the dissent in the case argued that the court of appeals correctly
followed the policy decision of the legislature in allowing “contracted-for
exclusions to reduce coverage.” 291 Thus, the dissent argued, since “Walls
and Nationwide contracted for liability coverage” in excess of the statutory
minimum while containing the step-down provision that allowed for a
reduction of that coverage for illegal acts, the contract should be enforced
as written. 292 Additionally, the dissent argued that the majority opinion
nullified many statutory provisions that allow “parties freedom to contract
for additional coverage and additional provisions.” 293
As previously discussed, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed this
issue and the question of strict contract considerations between parties that
allows parties the freedom to contract in Lewis by Lewis v. West American
Insurance Co. 294 While freedom to contract is a basic principle of contract
law, and insurance contracts are evaluated by these contract principles, the
Kentucky court identified an important distinction with regard to the
“freedom to contract” principle and what was permissible in a contract. 295
The court clarified that while freedom to contract any provisions acceptable
to both parties is an overarching principle of contract law, it may not apply
when the contract involves the public interest. 296
As discussed earlier, the business of insurance affects many aspects of
the lives of individuals and businesses, so states have a keen interest in
regulating insurance; thus, it is a matter of public interest. As a result, when
the contract involves matters of public policy versus contracts that are strictly
private, courts can deem certain provisions unenforceable and violative of
290
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292
293
294
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public interest and strike those provisions. 297 Additionally, contracts of
insurance are recognized as adhesion contracts with little or no bargaining
taking place between the parties. 298 Consequently, while freedom to contract
is an important tool to evaluate the enforceability of certain contract
provisions, if courts determine that provisions are violative of public policy
or public interest, they can exclude those clauses as unenforceable and still
enforce other portions of the contract. 299 The result in Walls ultimately
determined that even though the step-down provision was a part of the
contract, the clause violated statutory provisions and legislative intent and
therefore could not be enforced under South Carolina law. 300

C.

Reduction to Statutory Minimum is Not Against Public Policy, When
Coverage is Still Provided at the Applicable Statutory Minimum

1. Minnesota
In Babinski v. American Family Insurance Group, the United States
District Court for the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, held that the
“household drop-down exclusion” in an automobile policy applied and
reduced coverage to the statutory minimum. 301 Specifically, the policy’s
declarations page capped coverage for liability resulting from bodily injury
to $1,000,000. 302 The policy also contained within the exclusions section a
“household drop-down exclusion” that provided that the coverage did not
apply to “any person related to the operator and residing in the household
of the operator.” 303 Further, the exclusion stated that it only applied “to the
extent the limits of liability exceed the limits of liability required by law.” 304
In other words, the insurer took note to reduce coverage specifically when
the policyholder purchased coverage in excess of the statutory minimum.
In Babinski, the insured/tortfeasor was the husband of the
wife/plaintiff who was a passenger in the insured truck at the time of the
accident. 305 Both the husband and the wife died from injuries suffered in the
accident. 306 The wife’s estate made a claim for wrongful death against the
297
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estate of the husband under the policy. 307 The insurer applied the
“household drop-down provision” and reduced the coverage from
$1,000,000 to the statutory minimum of $30,000. 308 The wife’s estate then
filed suit, asserting that the exclusion was unenforceable because it was
ambiguous and contrary to the reasonable expectations of an insured. 309
In applying Minnesota insurance law, the Eighth Circuit found the
provision to be unambiguous despite the fact that the provision did not
specify the exact amount applicable when the reduction was enforced. 310
Rather, the court held that although the policy simply stated that the
coverage was limited to “the MINIMUM dollar amount required” by a
state’s “motor vehicle financial responsibility laws,” it did not create an
ambiguity. 311 More specifically, the court stated that Minnesota courts have
consistently held that drop-down exclusions are enforceable as long as they
satisfy the minimum coverage limits under the state’s no-fault act. 312
Therefore, the court held that while not specifying the amount, the
provision still resulted in a reduction to the statutory minimum and thus was
not a violation of the financial responsibility statute of the state. 313 The court
also found that the doctrine of reasonable expectations did not apply to the
case because “Minnesota’s doctrine of reasonable expectations is extremely
narrow” and applies only in “egregious situations” where an insurer has
disguised an exclusion. 314
Curiously, the court noted that because this was an “exclusion” and
listed in the exclusions section of the policy, it was “exactly where an insured
would expect it to be located.” 315 However, as noted above, under general
insurance law, exclusions are defined as denying coverage whereas stepdown or drop-down provisions reduce coverage. 316 Thus, while the court
and the insurer labeled the drop-down provision as an exclusion, it
functioned as a step-down provision that operated to reduce the coverage to
the statutory minimum. Consequently, an insured most likely would not
look in the exclusions section of the policy to find a provision that reduces
coverage based on the classification of the operator. Also, interestingly,
while the court restated the limited applicability of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, “Minnesota’s doctrine of reasonable expectations
is extremely narrow and ‘applies only on the few “egregious” occasions
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when an exclusion is disguised in a policy’s definitions section.’” 317

2. Missouri
Missouri has also addressed the relationship between the statutory
scheme and permissive user step-down provisions in Windsor Insurance
Co. v. Lucas. 318 In a case of first impression, the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that since Missouri law contains no clear implication that step-down
provisions should be prohibited, and that the state’s statutory scheme was
distinguishable from states whose statutes clearly prohibit step-down
provisions, the enforcement of step-down clauses at issue was not against
Missouri public policy. 319
In Windsor, Articia Lucas gave her boyfriend, Charles Billups,
permission to drive her automobile. 320 While driving, the
boyfriend/permissive user was involved in an accident. 321 Lucas was insured
by Windsor. 322 Several individuals made claims for compensation against
Billups. 323 The applicable insurance policy provided coverage of $100,000
per person and $300,000 per accident. 324 However, the policy contained a
step-down provision reducing the coverage to the Missouri statutory
minimum of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident in the event that
the injury was caused by a “non-relative” driver whom the insured permitted
to drive the car. 325 The trial court held that the policy was ambiguous based
on the fact that the language that “reduced coverage of permissive users was
found only in the ‘definitions’ portion of the policy and not in the ‘limits of
liability’ section.” 326 Additionally, the trial court found that the step-down
reduction was contradicted in several places in the policy and this created
an ambiguity. 327 Lastly, the trial court also declared that step-down provisions
for permissive users were against Missouri public policy and held the stepdown provision unenforceable. 328
However, on appeal, the appellate court first addressed the ambiguity
issue and then the public policy decision. In reviewing the ambiguity
question, the court determined that the policy sufficiently defined the
relevant terms and mentioned the step-down provisions several times in
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calculating the limits for permissive users. 329 Also, in finding that no
ambiguity existed, the court stated that “nowhere does the policy state that
the limits on the declarations page were final and absolute in every
situation.” 330 Further, the court recognized that there was no prohibition
under Missouri law for an insurance policy to set forth the maximum
amount the insurer will pay in one part and describe circumstances under
which the insurer may lower the amount it will pay in another part, as long
as the language is clear and unambiguous. 331
Further examining the issue of public policy, the court acknowledged
that Missouri courts recognize the freedom to contract in liability
insurance. 332 However, the court also noted that in order to find a violation
of public policy, there must be definite indications in the law of the
sovereignty to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to public
policy. 333 Specifically, the court must usually find support in statutory
provisions to determine if a contractual clause violates public policy. 334
Determining that the Missouri statutory scheme of requiring minimum
amounts of automobile coverage was reflective of public policy to ensure
that owners and operators of automobiles provided a minimum amount of
financial responsibility, and since the step-down provision reduced coverage
to that statutory amount, then the court held that the step-down clause did
not violate public policy. 335 Rather, the court determined that it met public
policy at the point where at least the reduced coverage did not violate the
required statutory minimum. 336 Thus, the appellate court held that the stepdown provision for permissive users did not violate public policy, was not
ambiguous, and was therefore enforceable reversing the trial court’s
findings. 337
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D. Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Does Not Apply to Analysis of
Step-Down Provisions
1. New Jersey
New Jersey is a state that has also considered the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in the context of step-down provisions in insurance policies. In
Morrison v. American International Insurance Co. of America, the New
Jersey Superior Court specifically addressed the issue of whether the
doctrine of reasonable expectations applied to set aside the step-down
provision clause contained in an insurance policy issued by the insurer. 338
The case involved a permissive user who was operating a vehicle owned and
insured by her parents. 339 At the time of the accident, the driver did not live
with her parents and was not a named insured on the policy. 340 The policy
declarations page reflected limits of $100,000 for liability and underinsured
motorist coverage per person and $300,000 per occurrence. 341 The policy
contained a permissive user step-down clause that limited recovery to the
statutory minimum for persons other than the named insured or resident
family members. 342 The insurer applied the permissive user step-down
provision to reduce the coverage to the statutory minimum. 343 The district
court then addressed the insured’s claim that the policy provision was
ambiguous and discussed the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 344 The
district court concluded that there was no meaningful ambiguity or
confusion and that the language of the step-down provision clearly applied
to someone in the in the plaintiff’s position. 345
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court noted that New Jersey
courts endorse “the principle of giving effect to the ‘reasonable expectations’
of the insured for the purpose of rendering a ‘fair interpretation’ of the
boundaries of insurance coverage.” 346 The result is that New Jersey
insurance law applies the doctrine of reasonable expectations by interpreting
ambiguous language of an insurance policy through the lens of the average
policyholder. 347 However, New Jersey courts also apply policy provisions as
written when the policy language is clear and unambiguous and hold that it
338
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is not the job of courts to rewrite policies where no ambiguity exists. 348
In finding that the policy in Morrison was not ambiguous, the court
determined that it did not conflict with the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. 349 Interestingly, the court admitted that the policy was “far from
perfect” and that it may have been more prudent for the insurer to point
out to the policyholder the step-down language. 350 Notwithstanding its own
statements about the confusing language used by the insurer and the lack of
notice to the insured, the court found the specific language defining
“insured” and “family member” unambiguous and the contract
unambiguous as a whole. 351 Therefore, the court reasoned, the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, as defined under New Jersey law, did not apply
and the permissive user step-down provision was valid and enforceable. 352
V.

CONCLUSION

Insurance, at its most basic, is to prevent surprise and allocate risk. Any
policy provision that significantly alters an insured’s expectations or results
in surprise should be examined as suspect. When considering such impacts
from what have commonly become known as step-down provisions, courts
and legislatures alike would be prudent to consider the thoughtful and
reasoned approach taken by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Williams v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 353 and
Nationwide v. Walls. 354
While the focus of this Article has been to assemble and report on the
variety of approaches to resolving disputes related to step-down policies, the
authors do endorse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Williams regarding familial exclusions by step-down provisions: “To allow
an insurer to determine the extent to which an injured party can recover
within the insured’s policy coverage based solely on a familial relationship
is arbitrary and capricious and violative of public policy.” 355 As cited in
Williams, the Washington Supreme Court in Mutual of Enumclaw
succinctly explained:
[Application of step-down provisions in real life scenarios is]
particularly disturbing when viewed in light of the fact that this
class of victims is the one most frequently exposed to the potential
negligence of the named insured. Typical family relations require
family members to ride together on the way to work, church,
348
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school, social functions, or family outings. Consequently, there is
no practical method by which the class of persons excluded from
protection by this provision may conform their activities so as to
avoid exposure to the risk of riding with someone who, as to
them, is uninsured. 356
The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decisions in Williams and Walls
are guideposts for proper examination of step-down provisions in the
context of modern insurance law. When faced with an insurer relying on a
step-down provision to limit coverage, courts should look first to the
language of the policy and determine whether there is any ambiguity.
Depending on this determination, a court should examine the specific
language of the policy at issue then proceed to apply doctrines such as contra
proferentem or reasonable expectations ambiguity analysis. Ambiguous
contracts should be determined based upon the basic definition that when
a term is reasonably susceptible to two or more reasonable constructions an
ambiguity is created. 357 In addition, courts should not only consider the
interaction between the coverage listed on the declarations page and
coverage reduced somewhere later in the policy by a provision, but also
where and how such provisions are placed and titled. When examining a
non-ambiguous policy, courts should engage in a comprehensive review that
includes reference to precedent, legislative determinations, specific statutory
language, and public policy considerations raised by enforcement, or denial,
of the asserted step-down provision.
Excluding family members via step-down provisions risks “far-reaching
effects that can impact a substantial segment of the population, as it serves
not only to markedly reduce coverage to family members, but it even
reduces the policy’s coverage to the named insureds . . . .” 358 Furthermore,
the social, legislative, and public policy goals to protect the “innocent victims
of motor vehicle accidents [would be] eviscerated by [allowing insurers to
reduce] coverage to injured family members, who are no less innocent
victims in accidents solely because they are injured by the negligence of a
family member.” 359
With regard to application of step-down provisions for reductions in
Id. (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 643 P.2d 441, 444 (Wash. 1982)).
See also Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729 (S.C. 1971)
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Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 716 (emphasis in original).
Id. (“It would indeed be an unusual public policy that would condone denying coverage to
a child where he or she is catastrophically injured while being driven by a parent to school,
but would allow recovery where the parent injures a stranger while on the way to work.”).
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non-familial circumstances, such as permissive user or felony clauses, the
authors endorse the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in
Nationwide v. Walls, based upon the same reasoning the court adopted in
Williams. Further, the Walls decision includes the appropriate, arguably
necessary, examination of historic or pending legislative action or inaction
on the subject in light of prior court decisions, as well as analysis of the
impacts of step-down provisions generally. Most important to the
considerations, however, are application of doctrines highlighted herein that
address fairness and prevent surprise for insureds like Sharmin Walls, who
are inevitably dismayed and harmed by the application of step-down
provisions within their automobile insurance policies.
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